CRIMINAL YEAR SEMINAR

April 17, 2020 Webinar



Criminal Code Update

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2020 APAAC CRIMINAL YEAR IN REVIEW: THE ARIZONA CRIMINAL CODE

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13-106. DEATH OF A CONVICTED DEFENDANT; DISMISSAL OF APPELLATE AND POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDINGS

A. On a convicted defendant's death, the court shall dismiss any pending appeal or postconviction proceeding.

B. A convicted defendant's death does not abate the defendant's criminal conviction or sentence of imprisonment or any restitution, fine or assessment imposed by the sentencing court.

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
STATE V. REED, 248 ARIZ. 72 (2020)

Issue:

Whether the Legislature had authority to enact A.R.S. § 13-106 and if the legislature did have authority, whether § 13-106(A) nevertheless violates state constitution by divesting defendants of their right to appeal



	STATE V. REED, 248 AF	RIZ. 72 (2020)	
Notes: Procedural v. substantive discussion Separation of powers See also: State v. Patel (pending in AZ Supreme Court – legislature's authority under VBR to cap restitution)			



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13-116. DOUBLE PUNISHMENT

An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different sections of the laws may be punished under both, but in no event may sentences be other than concurrent. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other, to the extent the Constitution of the United States or of this state require.

	STATE V. ROBERTSON, 246 ARIZ. 438 (APP. 2019), REVIEW GRANTED FEB. 11, 2020	
Jowied Jovited	Issue: Whether the sentence of imprisonment imposed after Robertson's probation was revoked was illegal under A.R.S. § 13-116 because she had already served a prison sentence for the same act involving the same victim.	

STATE V. ROBERTSON, 246 ARIZ. 438 (APP. 2019), REVIEW GRANTED

Plea Agreement





The State also argues that because Robertson's offenses occurred over a one-week period, the counts involved different acts and A.R.S. § 13-116 is not implicated. Because the invited-error doctrine resolves this case, we do not need to decide that issue.

Waiver v. invited error?

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13-502. <u>INSANITY TEST; BURDEN OF PROOF;</u> <u>GUILTY EXCEPT INSANE VERDICT</u>

A. A person may be found guilty except insane if at the time of the commission of the criminal act the person was afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such severity that the person did not know the criminal act was wrong. A mental disease or defect constituting legal insanity is an affirmative defense. Mental disease or defect does not include disorders that result from acute voluntary intoxication or withdrawal from alcohol or drugs, character defects, psychosexual disorders or impulse control disorders. Conditions that do not constitute legal insanity include but are not limited to momentary, temporary conditions arising from the pressure of the circumstances, moral decadence, depravity or passion growing out of anger, jealousy, revenge, hatred or other motives in a person who does not suffer from a mental disease or defect or an abnormality that is manifested only by criminal conduct.

STATE V. MALONE, 247 ARIZ. 29 (2019)

Issue:

Whether a defendant who introduces expert evidence of a character trait for impulsivity to challenge premeditation may also introduce evidence of brain damage to corroborate the existence of that trait.

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
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STATE V. MALONE, 247 ARIZ. 29 (2019)

Holding: Mental disease or defect evidence cannot be admitted to show that a defendant was less likely to have formed the mens rea element of a crime even if that evidence corroborates

behavioral-tendency evidence.





A. On a defendant's conviction for an offense causing economic loss to any person, the court, in its sole discretion, may order that all or any portion of the fine imposed be allocated as restitution to be paid by the defendant to any person who suffered an economic loss caused by the defendant's conduct.



13-105. DEFINITIONS		
cle, unless the context otherwise requires:	•	
on" means a human being and, as the context an enterprise, a public or private		
cion, an unincorporated association, a hip, a firm, a society, a government, a		
ental authority or an individual or entity of holding a legal or beneficial interest in	- U	

In this tin 30. "Pers requires, corporat partners government capable of property

STATE V. LEAL, 248 ARIZ. I (APP. 2019)


Holding

Although § 13–603(C) is somewhat restrictive in the persons or entities that may receive restitution, the availability of restitution under § 13–804(A) is broad. The trial court had discretion to award restitution to the Quechan Indian Tribe, who paid the victim's funeral expenses.

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13-1004. FACILITATION; CLASSIFICATION


A. A person commits facilitation if, acting with knowledge that another person is committing or intends to commit an offense, the person knowingly provides the other person with means or opportunity for the commission of the offense.



Holding: If it is possible to commit the charged offense without committing facilitation, a defendant is not entitled to a facilitation instruction just because the state seeks conviction on an accomplice liability theory; if the person cannot commit the charged offense without an accomplice, the person is entitled to a facilitation instruction

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"[O]ur supreme court has left open the possibility that a defendant would be entitled to a facilitation instruction if the charging document sets out facts that describe facilitation. ..." (citing State v. Scott, 177 Ariz. 131 (1993)).





Holding: Unless defendant can trace ownership to specific coins and bills in possession of debtor, debtor is owner of money in debtor's possession, and intent to steal is present when defendant at gun point or by force secures specific money that does not belong to defendant in order to apply it by such self-help to debt owed.

13-1805. SHOPLIFTING

A. A person commits shoplifting if, while in an establishment in which merchandise is displayed for sale, the person knowingly obtains such goods of another with the intent to deprive that person of such goods by:

I. Removing any of the goods from the immediate display or from any other place within the establishment without paying the purchase price; or

5 Concealment

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STATE V. MORRIS, 246 ARIZ. 156 (APP. 2019)

Issue: Whether shoplifting by concealment requires a person to pass the point of sale in order to "obtain" the goods of another with the intent to deprive that person of such goods.





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STATE V. MORRIS, 246 ARIZ. 156 (APP. 2019)

Holding: There is no requirement that the suspect pass the point of sale before committing shoplifting by concealment. The crime is complete at time of concealment.



13-2321. PARTICIPATING IN OR ASSISTING A CRIMINAL STREET GANG; CLASSIFICATION

- $\mbox{\bf A}.$ A person commits participating in a criminal street gang by any of the following:
- Intentionally organizing, managing, directing, supervising or financing a criminal street gang with the intent to promote or further the criminal objectives of the criminal street gang.
- Knowingly inciting or inducing others to engage in violence or intimidation to promote or further the criminal objectives of a criminal street gang.
- 3. Furnishing advice or direction in the conduct, financing or management of a criminal street gang's affairs with the intent to promote or further the criminal objectives of a criminal street gang.

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STATE V. HERNANDEZ, 246 ARIZ. 407 (APP. 2019)

Issue

Whether the interception of letters before they reached their recipients precludes convictions for participating in a criminal street gang because the language of § 13-2321 (A) requires completed communication between a defendant and the intended recipient of the communication



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STATE V. HERNANDEZ, 246 ARIZ. 407 (APP. 2019)

Under § 13-2321(A)(1),"[e]ach verb in § 13-2321(A)(1) implies an interaction between the person doing the organizing, managing, directing, financing, or supervising, and a criminal street gang." The Court noted that one of the letters showed that "Hernandez had managed, directed, and supervised other gang members before he sent the letters" and "even though the letters did not reach their intended recipients, they contained evidence from which the jurors could conclude that Hernandez organized, managed, directed, or supervised gang activity."

STATE V. HERNANDEZ, 246 ARIZ. 407 (APP. 2019)

"Under § 13-2321(A)(2), "inciting" or "inducing" individuals contemplates, "at a minimum, the State must show the defendant interacted in some way with the criminal street gang." "Because Hernandez's letters never reached their intended recipients and therefore could not have caused third parties to engage in violence, or even unsuccessfully encouraged them to do so, there was insufficient evidence to show" a violation.

Under \S 13-2321(A)(3), "the State was required ... to show Hernandez "[f]urnish[ed] advice or direction" to a criminal street gang" which requires completed communication. "[T]he defendant's efforts to furnish advice or instructions were unsuccessful" so there was no violation.

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STATE V. HERNANDEZ, 246 ARIZ. 407 (APP. 2019)



 $\textbf{Present Tense:} \underline{\textit{Tim}} \ \underline{\textit{walks}} \ \text{to the store.} \ (\text{Singular subject})$

Present Tense: Sue and Kimmy walk to the store. (Plural subject)

 $\textbf{Past Tense} : \textbf{Yesterday}, \underline{\textbf{they}} \ \underline{\textbf{walked}} \ \textbf{to the store for milk.} \ \textbf{(Plural subject)}$

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13-3967. RELEASE ON BAILABLE OFFENSES BEFORE TRIAL

A. At his appearance before a judicial officer, any person who is charged with a public offense that is bailable as a matter of right shall be ordered released pending trial on his own recognizance or on the execution of bail in an amount specified by the judicial officer.

E. In addition to any of the conditions a judicial officer may impose pursuant to subsection D of this section, the judicial officer shall impose both of the following conditions on a person who is charged with a felony violation of chapter 14 or 35.1 of this title and who is released on his own recognizance or on bail:

1. Electronic monitoring where available.

HISKETT V. LAMBERT, 247 ARIZ. 432 (APP. 2019)		
	Issue: Whether the defendant must pay the cost of pretrial electronic monitoring under A.R.S. 13-3967(E)?	

HISKETT V. LAMBERT, 247 ARIZ. 432 (APP. 2019)

Holding: superior court lacked statutory authority to order defendant to bear cost of electronic location monitoring during pretrial release. The phrase "where available" in subsection (E)(I) encompasses actual availability of the service as well as the financial ability of the county to pay the costs of the electronic location monitoring.

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
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22-301. JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS

A.The justice courts shall have jurisdiction of the following offenses committed within their respective precincts:

- I Misdemeanors and

- C. For the purposes of subsection A \dots of this section, an offense is committed within the precinct of a justice court if conduct constituting any element of the offense or a result of such conduct occurs either:
- I.Within the precinct.
- 2.Within [certain county parks]



LAY V. NELSON, 246 ARIZ. 173 (APP. 2019)

The Justice of the Peace (JP) Courts are county courts and are part of the State of Arizona Judicial System. The Arizona State Constitution, Article VI, and Arizona Revised Statues, Title 22 provide the courts the mandate for the administration of Justice.

Each county's board of supervisors sets the geographical boundaries, known as precinct Justice of the Peace courts. Generally, these precincts are larger that cities and towns and may contain more than one city or cownship. Although these geographical boundaries can be changed, a precinct cannot be abolished until the four-year term of the judge called a Justice of the Peace expires. The number of precincts in a county is determined by the County Board of Supervisors.

by the county observed by three precincts named for the city in which the court is located.

- Yuma County (Precinct 1)

- South County (Precinct 2)

Wellton (Precinct 3)
 Source: https://www.yumacountyaz.gov/government/courts/justice-courts/about-us

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LAY V. NELSON, 246 ARIZ. 173 (APP. 2019)

"Without question, § 22-301 establishes the subject-matter jurisdiction of a justice court" and recognized that there was little case authority interpreting § 22-301, focusing instead on the legislature's use of similar language in A.R.S. § 13-108 in describing the jurisdiction of the Arizona court system to try criminal offenses.







Accordingly, the justice court had subject-matter jurisdiction under § 22-301 to try both charges because the results of the two crimes occurred at the victims'

36-2802. ARIZONA MEDICAL MARIJUANA ACT ; LIMITATIONS

This chapter does not authorize any person to engage in, and does not prevent the imposition of any civil, criminal or other penalties for engaging in, the following conduct:

C. Smoking marijuana:

...

2. In any public place.

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STATE V. TAGGE, 246 ARIZ. 486 (APP. 2019)

Issue:Whether the "public place" exception to immunity under AMMA applies to smoking inside a private vehicle in a public parking lot.




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STATE V. TAGGE, 246 ARIZ. 486 (APP. 2019)

Holding: Immunity under AMMA does not extend to smoking marijuana in a public place. Public places under AMMA are not limited to enclosed areas. The fact that the public place was leased to a private company who then charged people to enter did not render it a non-public place. And the interior of the vehicle is not a separate space from the location in which it is found.






STATE V. MIXTON, 247 ARIZ. 212 (APP. 2019), REVIEW GRANTED NOV. 19, 2019

Issue:

Whether police acquisition of internet subscriber information and IP address violates Fourth Amendment of US Constitution or Arizona Constitution's private affairs clause (art. II, section 8)

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STATE V. MIXTON, 247 ARIZ. 212 (APP. 2019), REVIEW GRANTED NOV. 19, 2019 Topics addressed in COA's decision: * Carpenter v. United States (police acquisition of cell-site location information requires search warrant) * Reasonable expectations of privacy in the digital cloud-connected world * Held: No Fourth Amendment violation; AZ Constitution violation, but good faith applied





